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n the decade between 1913 and 1923, the U�S� Navy leveraged deliberate experi-
mentation in the Atlantic Fleet, theoretical analysis at the Naval War College, and 
practical experience in World War I to explore potential options for coordinat-
ing a modern fleet in battle� These efforts allowed effective doctrinal concepts 
to emerge from the bottom up, from the experiences of more-junior officers, 
and they triggered the development of the U�S� Navy’s first coherent tactical 
doctrine, issued in the Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer Instructions of 1921 and the U�S� 
Navy’s War Instructions of 1923� These manuals—and the implicit assumptions 
embedded within them—mark a watershed moment in the U�S� Navy’s approach 
to combat� They provided the foundation for doctrinal development in the in-
terwar period (1919–39) and influenced USN tactical concepts through the end 
of World War II� The emphasis placed on bottom-up doctrinal development 
was one reason the U�S� Navy was so effective at identifying and harnessing new 
techniques during this period�
This article examines the processes that led to 
those manuals� It explores the work of the Naval 
War College and explains how it enhanced the ef-
fectiveness of the fleet� It also analyzes the Atlantic 
Fleet’s tactical exercises, detailing how they refined 
the thinking of senior commanders and fostered 
experimentation by more-junior officers� Fur-
thermore, it discusses the U�S� Navy’s experience 
in World War I, the valuable lessons learned, and 
how these lessons were documented effectively in 
the immediate postwar period�
I
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The development and refinement of the U�S� Navy’s tactical doctrine from 
1913 to 1923 are a clear example of effective organizational learning� Before the 
start of World War I, the U�S� Navy possessed a modern battle fleet but had very 
little experience or knowledge of how to handle it in battle� Through experimen-
tation, analysis, and practical experience, officers developed an integrated set of 
concepts for coordinating their actions and functioning as a cohesive unit� These 
ideas became the foundation of the U�S� Navy’s tactical doctrine and served the 
U�S� Navy effectively for decades�1
DOCTRINE DEFINED
Before this article analyzes the Navy’s doctrinal development, it is important to 
define the concept of doctrine explicitly� Generally speaking, doctrine is the set 
of implicit and explicit assumptions that govern the behavior of a military force� 
Doctrine guides decisions in the absence of precise instructions� In this sense, it 
is similar to culture, ethos, and mind-set, but is much more specific� Doctrine is 
the collection of habits and behaviors that influence decision-making in combat�
The most important goals of doctrine are to ensure coordinated action in 
battle and to enhance the ability of ships and sailors to act toward the same end, 
even in circumstances in which the ability to communicate instructions is limited 
or impossible� Effective doctrine increases fighting power and helps overcome 
the friction of combat� As a 1938 manual explained, the Navy clearly understood 
doctrine this way: “The purpose of a written battle doctrine is to promote effec-
tive coordinated action in battle through mutual understanding� In the absence 
of instructions the doctrine should serve as a guide to sound decisions and ap-
propriate actions in battle� The written doctrine should, therefore, set forth those 
methods and principles of action that have been tested and found to produce the 
most advantageous results�”2
Ineffective doctrines, in contrast, inhibit coordinated action� They tend to suf-
fer from one of two extremes: either they stifle initiative by providing guidance 
that is too rigid and too exhaustive, or they limit coordination by failing to foster 
aligned decision-making� Effective doctrines are challenging to develop because 
they must strike a balance; they must create alignment while simultaneously 
avoiding rigid instructions that inhibit individual initiative�
This was the essence of the Navy’s struggle� Was it possible to create a frame-
work that allowed sufficient room for individual initiative while concurrently 
ensuring alignment of decentralized decision-making? In the years before World 
War I, American naval officers explored the options for coordinating a large, 
distributed battle fleet in combat� Their solution was a learning system that led 
to a sophisticated approach to doctrinal development�
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ANALYSIS AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
At the dawn of the twentieth century, naval tactics focused on coordinating the 
movements of a fleet in battle� Coordinated movement was critical; without it, 
ships fought as individuals and not as a cohesive whole� A formation fighting 
as individual ships was far less effective than a formation that maneuvered and 
fought together� However, an inability to experiment effectively at sea with large-
scale, coordinated, tactical maneuvers hampered the Navy’s development of ef-
fective approaches for coordinating the movements of large formations� At that 
time, the Navy was organized into numerous squadrons and distributed around 
the globe� The ships of those squadrons often were sent on independent missions, 
making tactical exercises with more than a handful of ships a near impossibility�3
Victory over Spain in 1898 made the United States a world power� As the fleet 
increased in size and capability, it was expected to be able to project naval power 
into the Caribbean and across the Pacific to protect American interests� In 1898, 
the Navy had just four modern battleships in commission; by 1905, there were 
twelve, with twelve more under construction� These ships had to be prepared to 
operate as a fleet and to fight and win a naval battle against a sophisticated op-
ponent, such as Germany (the focus of War Plan BLACK) or Japan (the enemy of 
War Plan ORANGE)� Yet without the ability to practice fleet operations, American 
naval officers had no clear sense of how best to ensure coordinated action in a 
modern naval battle�4
The rapid pace of technological change compounded the problem� Advances 
in fire control increased the effective range of ships’ guns, turbine engines and oil 
fuel made ships faster, face-hardened armor and new armor schemes made them 
more survivable, and advances in the design of shells and torpedoes made them 
more deadly� Radio technology allowed fleets to coordinate their movements 
over much greater distances in almost real time� New, specialized platforms—
scout cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft—augmented the more tradi-
tional battleships and armored cruisers� Modern fleets would move faster, strike 
harder, and operate over a much greater area than ever before� Naval combat was 
being revolutionized�
To determine how best to command and coordinate such a fleet in battle, the 
Navy experimented with a variety of mechanisms� Initially, because there was 
no large body of ships at sea, simulations at the Naval War College were used 
to test hypotheses, model new techniques, and provide tactical experience for 
officers� A crucial step was the introduction of strategic and tactical problems� 
Captain Henry C� Taylor, USN, who became President of the Naval War College 
in November 1893, worked with William McCarty Little, a retired lieutenant on 
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the College’s staff, to develop adversarial problems that encouraged the develop-
ment of new tactical approaches and improved the Navy’s ability to assess them�5
Ronald Spector described their approach as follows: “Through these methods 
the graduates of the Naval War College became accustomed to making quick 
decisions to cope with rapidly changing situations� The war problems, although 
somewhat unrealistic in nature, were nonetheless invaluable in giving the of-
ficer students the ‘feel’ of war situations and in teaching them the techniques of 
command�”6 The primary purpose of the problems was to further the education 
of officers, but they had a secondary effect� By exposing officers to simulated 
combat conditions, the problems uncovered new techniques that increased the 
Navy’s ability to coordinate forces in battle� Two specific techniques were essen-
tial to future developments�
The Conference Method
The first was the introduction of the conference method� Conferences were used 
first to evaluate potential solutions to strategic and tactical problems� Once the 
assigned solutions were complete, a conference was called� During the confer-
ence, officers openly critiqued each solution and discussed the best approaches� 
Eventually, the conference method became the standard technique for sharing 
information and collectively making sense of a complex situation�7 Conferences 
then were used to explore options at the start of a problem, before a specific 
solution had been devised� Prior to committing to a course of action, members 
of each opposing side would gather together in a conference and use their collec-
tive knowledge and experience to identify opportunities, courses of action, and 
potential solutions� Although a clearly established hierarchy would command the 
simulated forces during the execution of the problem, a flatter, more collabora-
tive, team-based structure became the norm for developing plans�8
The growing use of the conference method was a direct result of the col-
laborative nature of the Navy’s wargaming process� Unlike those in most other 
services, the Navy’s games employed active competition� Teams of opposing of-
ficers played different sides and actively tried to outmaneuver and outwit each 
other� This approach provided valuable practice and revealed the importance 
of creativity, or what the College’s most famous President, Rear Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, USN, called the “art of command�” For Mahan and his succes-
sors, artful execution of naval command required contextual interpretation of 
the underlying principles of naval warfare�9 As Rear Admiral Bradley A� Fiske, 
USN, summarized in his influential work, The Navy as a Fighting Machine: “In 
any human art and science—say medicine, music, or navigation—it is the art and 
not the science by which one gets results� � � � [T]he science is merely the foun-
dation on which the art reposes, and � � � it is by the practice of the art and not 
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the knowledge of the science that skill is gained�”10 The collaborative approach 
introduced by the conference method helped ensure that attendees of the Naval 
War College became more experienced in that art�
Estimate of the Situation
The second critical technique was the estimate of the situation� Introduced in 
1910, the estimate was a structured approach to problem solving that provided a 
common frame for conceptualizing and discussing approaches to wartime—or 
simulated wartime—conditions� It guided the work of officers who came together 
in a conference to develop plans and solve a problem� In a 1912 lecture on the 
subject, Commander Frank H� Schofield, USN, defined the estimate this way: 
“It is a method of applying knowledge and judgment to concrete situations� It 
is a natural method, one used unconsciously in every day life� A situation arises 
requiring action� We decide what the situation requires� We think of what diffi-
culties have to be overcome, what ways we have of overcoming them, and finally 
how we will go about the task�”11
The estimate had four basic components: the mission, an assessment of enemy 
forces, an evaluation of own forces, and finally the decision� The mission was the 
starting point; it usually was derived from instructions or orders from a superior� 
At the Naval War College, it was the foundation of the problem� Officers became 
practiced at reviewing their instructions thoroughly to produce a clear, and 
common, view of the mission� Schofield continued: “Experience has shown that 
the statement of a problem to men whose strategic and tactical ideas have not 
been coordinated by training will result in marked diversity in the statements of 
the mission. . . . We are working for unity of action� If the statement of the same 
problem to all can provoke the same statement of mission from each, then we 
have taken a sure and necessary step toward unity of action” (emphasis original)�12
Although Schofield did not use the term doctrine in his lecture, he clearly was 
aiming for the results that an effective doctrine would produce� The process of 
producing the estimate was intended to create a common conceptual frame, so 
that all officers would derive similar missions from the same problem statement� 
This was an important step for fostering alignment and cooperation toward a 
common goal� Collaboration in conference helped ensure that outcome�
Once the mission was identified, officers explored how the enemy could pre-
vent its accomplishment� In the enemy forces step, they examined the strength of 
enemy forces, their disposition, and their probable intentions� The most impor-
tant aspect of this step was assessing the situation from the enemy’s perspective 
to reduce the possibility of surprise� Schofield described the appropriate mind-
set as follows: “The effort should be � � � to arrive at the enemy’s point of view, to 
think as he would think of us, to consider all the plans that he would consider, 
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and to estimate which of those plans would be most injurious to us� � � � One must 
endeavor never to be caught in a situation that has not been foreseen and consid-
ered as a possibility� It is only by a thorough and pains taking [sic] consideration 
of the enemy’s probable intentions that surprise can be avoided�”13
Once the enemy’s most dangerous course of action had been considered, the 
next step was to examine the options available to one’s own forces. Officers were 
expected to analyze all avenues that could achieve the mission� One of these 
would be chosen, and that would become the decision—the foundation of orders 
for subordinates. Schofield emphasized that it was important to make the deci-
sion conclusive and resolute, so that it would inspire concerted action� However, 
he emphasized also that the decision should not project a plan too far into the 
future; a balance had to be struck so that the force could adjust and exploit un-
anticipated opportunities�14
Creating a Command Framework
Through the conference method and the estimate of the situation, the Naval War 
College created an initial conceptual framework for command in war� Although 
these specific approaches fell short of a doctrine, they did expose naval officers 
to a common methodology for structuring plans and orders, instill the value of 
working through strategic and tactical problems collaboratively, and uncover the 
challenges involved in the art of command� Practice using the conference method 
and the estimate of the situation also impressed on officers the importance of fos-
tering aligned, decentralized decision-making� This would be essential in actual 
combat with a large, modern battle fleet� Experimentation in the Atlantic Fleet 
would build on this foundation and lead to the Navy’s first deliberate experiments 
with creating a doctrine�
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE ATLANTIC FLEET
The inability of American naval officers to gain experience coordinating a large 
fleet at sea ended with the establishment of the Atlantic Fleet in April 1907� 
Formed by President Theodore Roosevelt and commanded initially by Admiral 
Robley D� Evans, USN, the Atlantic Fleet was employed as a platform for deliber-
ate experimentation in the ten years before the American entry into World War I�
Although many officers had become familiar with strategic and tactical prob-
lems at the Naval War College prior to the creation of the Atlantic Fleet, there 
had been no way to engage in similar exercises at sea� Once the Atlantic Fleet 
returned from its voyage around the world (often called the cruise of the Great 
White Fleet) in February 1909, contested exercises at sea began� The initial ver-
sions of Instructions for Battle Plan Exercises were published in 1910� In 1913, 
the Atlantic Fleet’s commander, Rear Admiral Charles J� Badger, USN, issued the 
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more sophisticated “Rules for Battle Maneuvers”; this marked the beginning of 
a new paradigm�
Badger’s 1913 “Rules” emphasized that the game board and fleet exercises 
complemented each other� The board was best at demonstrating tactical con-
cepts; exercises with the fleet provided practical experience� This mirrored the 
concepts of Bradley Fiske, a rear admiral serving as Secretary of the Navy George 
von Lengerke Meyer’s aide for operations� It is likely that Fiske influenced Bad-
ger’s “Rules�”15 This specified the following objectives for fleet exercises:
 a) To acquire familiarity with the aspect of a modern sea battle ground
 b) To give experience in handling squadrons, divisions, and ships
 c) To afford practice in quickly recognizing conditions and changes of conditions 
and in the appreciation of tactical principles
 d) To afford experience in noting and appreciating the actual physical features of 
wind, spray, smoke, sun, etc�, and their influence
 e) To afford opportunity for gunnery training and particularly for the exercise of 
range finder, plotting, and fire control parties under battle conditions
 f) To exercise signal and radio parties16
While simulations and wargames could explore the theory of naval combat, 
exercises at sea were essential for developing the practical experience required 
to command the fleet effectively in battle� Accordingly, the exercises focused on 
coordinating the movements of the entire fleet: “When all ships work together � � � 
when each knows that his neighbor knows what he is doing, because they have 
all been given sound practical methods, then much of the difficulty of handling 
formations will disappear, and a few simple signals, by flags or by radio, or by 
both will suffice to handle naval forces� This will require the thorough constant 
practice, which will produce satisfaction and confidence born of efficiency�”17
To help run the exercises and ensure the rules were applied appropriately, each 
ship appointed an umpire� Umpires kept track of the action and scored the appro-
priate damage� Dice were used to assess the impact of gun and torpedo fire� Lights 
and flag signals designated targets� The accuracy of the exercise and therefore its 
value as a learning tool depended on the performance of the umpires� Badger’s 
“Rules” noted that “careless or inaccurate scoring may vitiate the results of an 
otherwise excellently conducted maneuver�”18
Larger-scale maneuvers were held on an annual basis, in either the Atlantic or 
the Caribbean� The most sophisticated of these foreshadowed the more-famous 
fleet problems of the interwar period� Strategic Maneuver 3, conducted August 
20–31, 1916, was a good example� It simulated an effort by a European power to 
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seize a base on the East Coast of the United States� These kinds of exercises, in 
which one fleet aggressively challenged the Monroe Doctrine, were common-
place� They helped the Navy improve fleet tactics and provided valuable experi-
ence in coordinating the movements of dispersed forces over a large area� One of 
the most important lessons learned in these exercises was that the Navy lacked 
effective scouting vessels; destroyers were pressed into the role, but the small 
ships often had difficulty maintaining speed in the heavy Atlantic seas�
Some exercises investigated specific topics; fast wing tactics were some of the 
most common� The Navy lacked battle cruisers, a new ship type that the Royal 
Navy (RN) introduced with its Invincible class, and the Americans were curious 
to understand how they could be used� Battle cruisers combined the firepower of 
a battleship with high speed, but sacrificed protective armor� The Navy explored 
how these ships might operate—and how best to fight against them—by using 
substitute vessels; they generally were positioned as a fast wing ahead of the battle 
fleet� These maneuvers repeatedly illustrated the importance of concentrated 
firepower; the fast ships often found themselves isolated from the support of their 
main body� Opponents that remained together and fought as an integrated unit 
generally overwhelmed them�19
However, that was not always the case� Tactical Problem 33-13 of July 25, 1913, 
pitted the fleet’s destroyers, representing a force of high-speed battleships, against 
the fleet’s battleships� The destroyers split into three divisions, and although they 
did not remain concentrated, they coordinated their maneuvers so as to come 
into action almost simultaneously� The battleships also split into three divisions, 
but one of the flank divisions failed to keep the destroyers on the beam and 
was judged to have been damaged seriously� The commentary on the problem 
considered it “interesting and instructive as a tactical exercise” because it “pre-
sented several features which had not been previously brought out during fleet 
maneuvers�”20 Much of this may have been because of the new techniques that the 
commander of the destroyers was employing with his subordinates�
That commander was Captain William S� Sims, USN, who had come to the 
Atlantic Fleet’s Torpedo Flotilla earlier that month� He was responsible for the 
fleet’s destroyers, and prior to assuming command of the flotilla Sims had at-
tended the Naval War College� While there, he met Lieutenant Commander 
Dudley W� Knox, USN, who had been agitating for the development of a uniform 
doctrine of command� Knox’s March 1913 prizewinning essay on the subject 
emphasized that the existing approach of issuing lengthy orders was insufficient 
to “produce the unity of effort—the concert of action—demanded by modern 
conditions in a large fleet�” Instead, it killed initiative and engendered a spirit of 
“blind obedience�”21
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   108 8/23/19   9:18 AM
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss4/8
 H O N E  1 0 9
Sims appreciated this perspective and brought Knox with him to the Atlantic 
Fleet as his aide� Other talented officers joined them� Commander William V� 
Pratt, USN, another acquaintance from Sims’s time at the Naval War College, 
served as Sims’s chief of staff� Lieutenant John V� Babcock, USN, served as their 
operations officer� Together, these four officers turned the flotilla into a labora-
tory for the development of tactical doctrine� Sims explained his concept in a let-
ter: “The torpedo fleet could be made an enormous game board—an exceedingly 
valuable school for trying out all kinds of maneuvers at small expense� There is 
a lot to be learned� None of us knows much about it yet� But one thing is sure, 
and that is that it can only be learned by study combined with actual maneuvers 
with the Fleet�”22
Sims recognized that his command had limited practical experience� His 
young destroyer commanders were knowledgeable, talented, and prepared to be 
aggressive, but they lacked a uniform approach to tactical situations� Their ac-
tions were not cohesive, and they were unable to work together to turn their small 
ships’ powerful torpedoes into potent weapons� Doctrine became the means by 
which Sims fostered collaboration and brought cohesion to his force, increasing 
their offensive potential�
To create a flotilla doctrine, Sims inaugurated the use of the conference method for 
staff study and work with the destroyermen� � � � [Sims] recognized that the Navy’s 
hierarchical system would not permit his subordinates to disagree with him very 
vigorously or advance their own ideas unless he changed the ground rules� Thus he 
called for setting aside rank in conference—ideas would be studied on their merits 
irrespective of origin� Dissent and argument became the rule of the conference until 
consensus occurred; then all were expected to give complete loyalty to the operating 
plan and the guiding doctrine�23
Sims leveraged his experience with the conference method and the estimate of 
the situation at the Naval War College and brought these ideas to the flotilla� They 
enabled him to draw on the skills and abilities of his subordinates and develop 
effective plans collaboratively� They discussed upcoming exercises and experi-
mented with options during tabletop wargames aboard Sims’s flagship� This led 
to greater cohesion in maneuvers and exercises; it also increased familiarity and 
trust within the flotilla� Sims’s subordinates learned how to act as a unit� Regular 
conferences, repeated practice, and constant refinement led to the development 
of a common doctrine�24 This foundation helped the destroyer commanders out-
maneuver their opponents repeatedly in tactical exercises�
Destroyer torpedoes were powerful weapons, but their range was limited� De-
stroyers had to close with larger, more-powerful ships to attack effectively, and it 
was much easier to do so under the cover of darkness� Coordinated night attacks 
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were very difficult, but with practice, Sims’s captains became extremely adept at 
them�25 Their well-coordinated night torpedo attacks illustrated that battleship 
formations were vulnerable, even when screened by other ships�26 Sims reported 
on one such attack in March 1915: “During recent exercises, the flotilla attacked 
the double screened battleship fleet with actual torpedoes� Eighteen torpedoes 
were fired, and 11 and probably 13 hits were made� Six or seven battleships, in-
cluding three dreadnaughts [sic] were struck from one to three times� � � � [T]he 
problem � � � was a question of protecting a fleet by having its main body screened 
against the attack of torpedo destroyers�”27
This remarkable result—sinking or disabling at least six battleships—was 
made possible by the Torpedo Flotilla’s new doctrine� Sims was making the most 
of his small ships and the aggressive spirit of his captains� A general plan, framed 
by the estimate of the situation, provided high-level coordination� The habits and 
routines developed through repeated exercises aligned decision-making at the 
tactical level and eliminated the need for detailed orders� This approach allowed 
Sims to maximize the individual initiative of his captains while focusing them on 
a common goal�
In his comments on Tactical Problem 35-13, held in July 1913, Sims described 
one of the methods he used to develop doctrine: “Previous to the maneuver, two 
forenoons were spent by the Flotilla Commander and all destroyer captains in 
playing the problem on the maneuver board on the [flagship] Dixie, and it is be-
lieved that this training was of great benefit to the officers concerned in actually 
executing the problem on the water�”28 These kinds of exercises helped officers 
develop a shared sense of how to approach specific situations, but they were not 
intended to provide rote solutions� Sims’s goal was to align decision-making� Re-
peated exercises on the game board and at sea were coupled with frequent confer-
ences to share lessons and discuss alternatives, leading to constant improvements 
and refinements�
One of the most important aspects of the flotilla’s doctrine was the stress it 
placed on aggressive action� According to Thomas Hughes, “under Sims, de-
stroyer men adopted an aggressive ethic based on speed, agility, and daring�”29 By 
emphasizing individual initiative, the officers of the flotilla maximized their po-
tential for aggressive action; it became the essence of their doctrine and was very 
influential� Many of the Navy’s future leaders, including Ernest J� King, Harold 
Stark, Rufus Zogbaum Jr�, Aubrey Fitch, Harris Laning, George Cook, John New-
ton, William Halsey, Franck T� Evans, and Frank Jack Fletcher, were immersed in 
Sims’s laboratory and influenced by the flotilla’s tactics and doctrine; they would 
take these ideas with them as they moved on to greater responsibilities�
In the summer of 1914, Sims returned to the Naval War College to give a lec-
ture that described how the “principles and methods developed � � � at the college 
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have been applied in the administration of the Flotilla and in the development of 
its tactics�” Sims emphasized the benefits of the conference method� There was, in 
his words, “no possible excuse for not utilizing � � � all the knowledge, experience, 
energy, and brains that the organization contains�” The conferences drew out this 
knowledge, leading to more-effective solutions� They also fostered a “team spirit 
and a team loyalty” that created greater alignment throughout the organization�30 
In his lecture, Sims highlighted the development of the flotilla’s new night search-
and-attack doctrine, which was refined and analyzed in a series of exercises and 
numerous conferences before it was truly effective�
By 1915, enough experience had been gained with the flotilla’s doctrine to 
codify it� The General Service Instructions for the flotilla, issued in 1915, de-
scribed its mission, organization, and doctrine as developed under Sims�31 The 
increasing sophistication of the flotilla’s approach, and its well-considered doc-
trine, provided a mechanism for coordinating distributed action in battle and led 
to an increasing emphasis on the potential for destroyers to contribute to major 
fleet engagements� This was reflected in the Atlantic Fleet’s 1916 “Battle Instruc-
tions,” in which destroyers were recognized as a core offensive weapon of the 
fleet—a testament to the effectiveness of the flotilla’s doctrine�32
The 1916 “Battle Instructions” was issued by Rear Admiral Frank Friday 
Fletcher, USN (uncle of the destroyer captain Frank Jack Fletcher), in May� It 
reflected his experience as Atlantic Fleet commander over the previous sixteen 
months� In the “Instructions,” Fletcher emphasized the importance of concen-
trated firepower� This had been a standard element of the Navy’s approach for 
years, but Fletcher’s take on it was different�33 He emphasized concentrating all 
the weapons of the entire fleet, not only the gunfire of its battleships� This was a 
new paradigm, one that would remain at the core of the Navy’s tactical approach 
through the end of World War II�34 It was the success of the flotilla’s doctrine that 
led to an emphasis on using all arms to destroy the enemy in battle�
Fletcher’s “Instructions” also introduced a new, more flexible approach to 
command� He assumed that the conditions of battle would be fundamentally 
uncertain� Although detailed plans could be developed, the assumptions embed-
ded in them would not survive for long� Therefore, Fletcher expected to foster 
collaboration among his subordinates by issuing a high-level battle plan� The 
plan would not provide detailed instructions; instead, it would give sufficient 
background to explain his intentions� Commanders were expected to remain 
flexible and adjust depending on specific circumstances� Fletcher expected them 
to exploit emerging opportunities� 
A plan of battle will specify the role to be played by each subdivision of the fleet in 
the situation which the plan is intended to cover; it will fix the direction � � � from 
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which the enemy is to be attacked; the speed of the force; � � � the direction in which 
the enemy is to be turned or the turn that is to be denied; whether the attack is to be 
pressed home to short range or kept at long range; whether a quick decision is to be 
sought for or containing tactics adopted; whether destroyers are to attack the enemy, 
deny him a certain area, or remain in reserve as a means of giving a coup de grace�35
Fletcher’s approach dovetailed perfectly with that of Sims� Both men relied 
on the concept of a high-level plan to provide context for their subordinates� 
But rather than prescribing specific actions, they embraced the more flexible ap-
proach fostered by the estimate of the situation, which stressed communicating 
intentions and general concepts so that subordinates could use their own initia-
tive to further progress toward the desired outcome�
Doctrine complemented this approach� In 1914, Commander Pratt took a 
break from his work with the flotilla and lectured at the Naval War College�36 
Together with Lieutenant Commander Harry E� Yarnell, USN, Pratt refined the 
theory behind the flotilla’s methods and brought it to a broader pool of officers� 
Yarnell continued this work, providing a fledgling definition of doctrine to the 
College’s class of 1915: “A doctrine is simply a code of rules upon which we act 
spontaneously and without order, for the accomplishment of the mission� To be 
of value the doctrine must be based on correct principles and methods of con-
ducting war� Then it must be instilled by study and actual fleet training into the 
minds of officers until it becomes almost a reflex action�”37
Among a small pool of officers, this concept was becoming the preferred 
mechanism for ensuring coordinated action without the need for precise orders 
or firm control� Yarnell, Sims, Pratt, Knox, and others believed that doctrine was 
the key to unity of action in a modern, diverse, and distributed battle fleet� As 
Yarnell described: “From skill and doctrine flows the initiative of the subordinate� 
Give the subordinate a proper understanding of the mission and proper train-
ing, and he may be relied upon to act correctly in an emergency when orders or 
instructions from higher authority are not available�”38 Knox’s conception was 
similar; he argued that “doctrine gives birth to harmonized methods, rules, and 
actions” and that doctrine “is necessary before concerted action � � � is possible; it 
is an indispensable element of command, and an essential prelude to great suc-
cess in war�”39
This emerging concept of doctrine integrated well with Fletcher’s new ap-
proach to battle plans� Fletcher expected his plans to provide context and explain 
his objectives; he would leave his subordinate commanders free to act on their 
own initiative in furtherance of them� This method allowed those officers to 
adjust to changing circumstances� If a common doctrine was available to guide 
them, they would have a shared context for decision-making, ensuring greater 
alignment in the confusion of battle� Like Yarnell, Captain Albert P� Niblack, 
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USN, argued in favor of such an approach� “Once the action is joined the sub-
ordinates are dependent upon their own initiative, because signaling in battle is 
difficult, and hence arises the necessity for battle doctrine� In the rapidly changing 
phases of battle � � � decisions must be made and must be executed without the loss 
of the time necessary to signal to higher authority� � � � Thus arises the principle of 
the initiative of the subordinate, growing out of battle doctrine, the plan of battle, 
and indoctrination” (emphasis original)�40
If the work of the Torpedo Flotilla was not convincing enough, there were 
numerous historical examples—by now a staple of Naval War College analyses—
that could be used to justify the development of a common doctrine�
A tentative doctrine has been established in the Torpedo Flotilla, and a very able 
officer of high rank has pronounced it the greatest single achievement he has seen in 
thirty years’ service� � � � We cannot recall to mind too often the splendid examples of 
doctrine supplied by the life of Nelson, or the victories that resulted in 1870 through 
the doctrine of German commanders to enter eagerly into battle, to support each 
other, to deny defeat and to grasp victory through concert of action and unity of  
mission—the destruction of the enemy�41
However, this concept was new, and its importance was not recognized widely� 
Most officers still viewed tactics as a discipline involving precise maneuvering 
rather than a shared contextual understanding� It would be years before the fledg-
ling doctrine developed by Sims’s flotilla became the Navy’s dominant approach 
to coordinated action in combat�42
EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR I
Participation in World War I provided the Navy with valuable experience while at 
the same time invalidating many existing assumptions about naval warfare� Un-
expectedly, the most pressing enemy was not the German battle line but the tena-
cious U-boats; when the United States entered the war, the Navy was ill equipped 
to deal with this threat� However, the nascent destroyer doctrine developed in the 
Atlantic Fleet proved a valuable guide� Experience partnering with Great Britain’s 
Royal Navy also provided a unique learning opportunity, exposing American of-
ficers to a wealth of wartime lessons�
Battleship Division 9 of Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, USN—consisting of 
New York, Delaware, Florida, and Wyoming—arrived at Scapa Flow, the RN base 
in the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, on December 7, 1917�43 The ships be-
came the 6th Battle Squadron of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet� Operations with 
the Grand Fleet provided valuable experience for Rodman and eventually the en-
tire Navy through exposure to “British signals, radio codes, maneuvering orders, 
fire control methods, and battle instructions�”44
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In battle, the Grand Fleet coordinated its movements through a sophisticated 
set of instructions and plans� To keep the battleships concentrated, they cruised 
in a compact formation of parallel columns� In battle they deployed, generally 
by turning ninety degrees and forming a single line, perpendicular to the bear-
ing of the enemy—a formation similar to those the Navy had been using since 
the creation of the Atlantic Fleet� The Grand Fleet’s light forces—destroyers and 
cruisers—would arrange themselves on the flanks of the battle line, slightly closer 
to the enemy� From these positions, they could protect the flanks from enemy at-
tack and also be ready to close the enemy line and attack with torpedoes� These 
formations were clear and well suited to an action between battle fleets� The Navy 
adopted similar battle formations after the war, arranging its ships to maximize 
concentrated firepower against the enemy battle line�45
However, the Navy’s officers viewed the Grand Fleet’s large set of instructions 
less favorably� This was particularly true when viewed against the outcome of 
the war’s largest naval battle, the Battle of Jutland, fought in May 1916� Almost 
as soon as the battle was over, American officers began to examine it in the hope 
of drawing out effective lessons� Lieutenant Holloway H� Frost, USN, was one of 
them� He entered the Naval War College in 1916 and, in cooperation with Yarnell 
and Niblack, conducted a wargame to re-create the battle in September 1916� 
Sims and Knox traveled to Newport to join them and learn from the exercise� In 
November, Frost produced an official College report on the battle�46
Frost’s greatest criticism, as it developed in later years, was that the Grand 
Fleet’s guiding orders and principles emphasized the avoidance of risk and the 
preservation of the fleet� Decisive action would be sought only if a positive out-
come could be guaranteed�47 Captain Harris Laning, USN, who learned about the 
importance of doctrine under Sims in the Torpedo Flotilla and later taught tactics 
at the Naval War College, stressed that the Grand Fleet’s commander, Admiral 
John R� Jellicoe, RN, adopted a defensive posture and that he was “unwilling to 
pay � � � for the victory which � � � lay in his grasp,” despite placing his force “in one 
of the most powerful positions ever obtained�”48
Frost, Laning, and other American officers who examined Jutland highlighted 
the fact that RN officers failed to act with the necessary initiative� They missed 
opportunities to damage the enemy; failed accurately to report sightings to 
higher authority; and embraced a risk-averse attitude that, with a few notable 
exceptions, seemed to dominate Jellicoe’s fleet�49 Part of the reason was believed 
to be the Grand Fleet’s detailed instructions, which were blamed for restricting 
the initiative of subordinates� Laning explained it this way: “The British failed to 
gain decisive victory � � � because their higher commanders � � � had not prepared 
themselves and their subordinates to win�”50
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It is important to note, however, that there are alternative explanations for the 
outcome at Jutland; David G� Morgan-Owen’s recent study of British war plan-
ning, for example, argues that the Royal Navy became focused on defense of the 
British Isles, limiting opportunities to use the Grand Fleet offensively�51 Regard-
less, the U�S� Navy resolved to take a very different approach and stressed the 
importance of capitalizing on opportunities by deliberately developing methods 
that promoted subordinate commanders’ aggressive action�
Sims’s doctrine provided a sound basis for this� Before the American entry into 
the war, he commanded battleship Nevada and was promoted to rear admiral� He 
became President of the Naval War College in January 1917 but was ordered to 
London at the end of March� His mission was to liaise with officers of the Royal 
Navy and prepare for the American entry into the war� When that occurred in 
April, Sims was made commander of American naval forces in Europe, and in 
May he received a temporary promotion to vice admiral� It was an ideal opportu-
nity to spread his approach to doctrine, and he wasted no time�
Sims and his staff—which included Knox, Yarnell, Schofield, and Babcock—
issued a doctrine to his European command that stressed two critical compo-
nents derived from his experiences in the Atlantic Fleet and time at the College� 
The first was the use of a mission and general plan� These focused the attention 
of subordinates on critical objectives and promoted mutual understanding, both 
of which were essential for fostering individual initiative�
It is manifestly impossible for the Commander of the operation to give detailed 
instructions in advance that will cover all emergencies; it is equally impossible for the 
Commander of an operation to give these instructions on the spot to meet adequately 
a local situation suddenly developed� Hence the importance of having the immediate 
Mission and General Plan clearly understood in advance, and the necessity for leav-
ing as wide an area of discretion to subordinates as possible�52 
That discretion was the second critical component� Sims stressed the need 
for individual initiative to overcome uncertainty in battle: “No officer should 
fail to exercise his initiative and judgment in support of the General Plan 
when confronted by unexpected conditions�” Sims expected this doctrine to 
be “a bond of mutual understanding governing the application of principles to 
circumstances�”53 The creative energies of subordinates would translate the mis-
sion and general plan into desired outcomes through coordinated action�
It worked� Sims collaborated with his subordinates and the British to develop 
effective doctrines for hunting U-boats, combating German raiders, and escort-
ing convoys� These were augmented by an emphasis on the kind of wargames 
and shipboard exercises he had employed in the Atlantic Fleet�54 Through these 
mechanisms, many more officers—particularly destroyer captains—became 
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familiar with Sims’s approach to doctrinal development� The success of these 
methods in war validated them, and they served as a basis for future development 
in the early interwar period�
DOCTRINE DELIBERATELY CREATED
In 1919, after the war ended, Sims returned to the Naval War College� It had 
been closed during the war, and his first task was to reestablish it� He wanted it 
to become a more influential institution and to allow a broader pool of officers 
to benefit from its methods� He asked Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to 
increase class sizes, augment the staff, and assign higher-ranking officers to head 
the major departments� Daniels was a firm believer in education, and he readily 
agreed to make the necessary changes�55
By the end of 1921, about half the admirals within the fleet and their chiefs of 
staff were graduates of the College, a testament to Sims’s efforts and a reflection 
of the growing influence of the institution�56 Sims made sure that these officers 
were exposed to the doctrinal approaches that the Atlantic Fleet had pioneered 
before the war by selecting now-captain Dudley Knox as his chief of staff� During 
their tenure, Sims and Knox continued to emphasize the use of wargames and the 
conference method that had been a staple of the College for years: “The applica-
tory system of Captain [William McCarty] Little, built upon the use of the game 
board to illustrate problems of strategy and tactics, continued as the basic method 
of instruction�”57 Collaborative learning and problem solving continued, as John 
M� Lillard explains: “War College leadership, faculty, and students all contributed 
toward creating a climate that encouraged experimentation and learning in a 
group setting�”58
The efforts of Sims and Knox were aided by some very specific recommenda-
tions made by a board that Knox chaired in 1919� The Knox-Pye-King Board—
staffed by Knox, Captain Ernest J� King, USN, and Commander William S� Pye, 
USN—examined the current state of officer instruction and argued for a junior 
Naval War College course that would ensure “the whole body of commanding 
officers and of unit commanders and their staffs have common conceptions of � � � 
practical methods which are requisite for thorough cooperation and coordina-
tion” to make “unity of command” a reality in battle�59 The board felt that officers 
needed greater familiarity with “the advanced elements of the profession, includ-
ing training in the application of the doctrine and principles of naval warfare” 
before they would be ready to command at sea�60
Two different commands explored how best to accomplish this goal� The 
first was that of Rear Admiral Charles Plunkett, USN� He was a graduate of the 
Naval War College and familiar with its methods� He assumed command of the 
Atlantic Fleet’s destroyers in 1919 and, like Sims before him, emphasized tactical 
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experimentation� Plunkett helped foster the creation of a learning system with 
the help of his chief of staff, Captain Laning� Laning understood well the impor-
tance of doctrine from his time in the Torpedo Flotilla� Together they promoted a 
new, more formal approach to doctrinal development that harnessed the lessons 
of war and enhanced cooperation�
Plunkett and Laning created a “school of doctrine” at Charleston, South Caro-
lina, to investigate how best to coordinate their ships in battle� Captain Yarnell 
led many of the efforts of this school and continued to promote the concept of 
doctrine actively� For instance, he often gave lectures and led committees respon-
sible for the development of standing orders and attack procedures�61 In addition, 
Yarnell maintained an ongoing correspondence with Sims, allowing him to incor-
porate the latest thinking from the Naval War College into his work�
The second command that explored how best to develop doctrine was in 
the Pacific Fleet� Captain Pratt, another veteran of Sims’s Torpedo Flotilla, as-
sumed command of the Pacific Fleet’s Destroyer Force in November 1920 and 
introduced an approach that paralleled the one in the Atlantic Fleet� Pratt and 
his subordinates—including other former members of the Torpedo Flotilla such 
as William Halsey—continued to promote an aggressive doctrine well suited to 
destroyers� Pratt established a “destroyer staff college” at San Diego to allow for 
regular experimentation and indoctrination�62
The Atlantic Fleet’s school and Pratt’s college regularly exchanged lessons and 
collaborated�63 The name “staff college” more aptly described their work, so the 
school at Charleston changed its name and became the Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer 
Staff College� Commander William Victor Tomb, USN, commented on its work 
in 1921� “My first impression � � � upon observing the work done at the Staff 
College was one of amazement that such excellent tactical maneuvers could be 
carried on by the Officers of the Destroyer Force of whom only the Force Com-
mander and the Director of the maneuvers were War College graduates�”64 The 
three colleges—at Charleston, San Diego, and Newport—deliberately worked on 
improving and refining the Navy’s destroyer doctrine�
The destroyer staff colleges also familiarized a broader pool of officers with 
the latest techniques and improved their skills� It was part of a conscious effort 
to ease the transition back to a peacetime footing� Laning and others were wor-
ried that the lessons of war would be lost if tactical thinking stagnated: “The 
more we can fight off this effect [stagnation] by work and study along the lines 
of our profession, and by an endeavor to embody in our ‘War Instructions’ the 
best ideas as developed in past wars, in study, and research, that much easier will 
be our task when the next war comes� The work at this Staff College is one effort 
towards that end�”65
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Soon, enough experience had been gained to issue a new tactical manual� It 
would blend lessons learned during the war with experimentation in tabletop 
problems, fleet exercises, and the latest thinking in both colleges� Captain C� R� 
Train, USN, was responsible for the committee that produced the manual, and by 
September it had completed its work, as noted in the “History of the Destroyer 
Staff College”:
The final result of the year’s work as planned by Captain Laning was to be a manual 
of Destroyer Doctrine covering all phases of destroyer activities in war� Although 
considerable work was done this mission was not finally accomplished until Septem-
ber of this year [1921] when a committee of officers headed by Captain C� R� Train 
completed the compilation of “Destroyer War Instructions” embodying the work of 
the Staff College at Charleston, the Destroyer Staff College at San Diego, and other 
available destroyer practice as developed in the World War� � � � This manual � � � will 
be � � � tested out on the game board and by actual squadron maneuvers at sea�66
Under Plunkett and Pratt—with encouragement by Sims—the Navy’s de-
stroyer forces were a hotbed of doctrinal experimentation and development� The 
resulting manual, the Atlantic Fleet’s 1921 “Destroyer Instructions,” represented 
a new paradigm� It was the first fleet manual developed through a deliberately 
created system of learning� The system seamlessly blended problem solving 
and experimentation ashore—in the destroyer staff colleges and the Naval War 
College—with exercises at sea� The introduction to the manual reinforced this 
point, noting that the “Instructions” was “based upon the best obtainable ex-
perience of our Service preceding and during the recent war, supplemented by 
considerable subsequent game board and practical experience and trial�”67 It was 
a comprehensive manual designed to provide guidance to the fleet’s destroyers 
while still preserving scope for independent action by individual ship and squad-
ron commanders� Future doctrinal publications would follow a similar paradigm, 
as the work of the fleet became more closely integrated with that of the Naval 
War College�
Plunkett and Pratt developed a more sophisticated approach than other 
commands, but their basic concept became the Navy’s standard model for doc-
trinal development in the early interwar period� The War Instructions of 1923 
codified this model; with its publication, doctrine became a core aspect of the 
Navy’s tactical development� The War Instructions stressed that indoctrination 
was essential but also emphasized that doctrinal development would be driven 
by individual commands and not handed down from the fleet level� Doctrine 
would emerge from the bottom up; it would not be imposed top down� Individual 
commands were responsible for developing their own doctrines to reflect the 
specific strengths and limitations of their forces� This flexible approach allowed 
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the Navy to remain open to new ideas and encouraged the creativity of low-level 
commanders�
However, the flexible approach also meant that a coherent doctrine for the 
entire fleet was lacking� Some officers urged the development of a more common 
and centralized approach� Captain Knox was particularly critical in a lecture he 
gave at the Naval War College in 1924� Knox called doctrine a “basis for harmo-
nious decisions” and stressed that it was the only effective way to coordinate the 
actions of distributed forces in battle� “No plan, however well it may be expressed, 
can possibly be co-ordinately executed by a large force of vessels of several types 
operating against a strong and efficient enemy, unless the squadron, division, and 
ship commanders have the same conceptions of war as their commander-in-chief 
and are well indoctrinated�”68
The War Instructions sought to achieve this end but deliberately avoided a 
comprehensive approach� In part, this was a reaction to the Navy’s experience 
in World War I and the negative impression created by the Grand Fleet’s exten-
sive and detailed orders� The comprehensive instructions were believed to have 
inhibited the initiative of subordinate commanders� As James J� Tritten explains: 
“These fighting instructions [the Grand Fleet Battle Orders] attempted to provide 
guidance for all eventualities and offered the unit commander very little oppor-
tunity for his own initiative� They were issued several times during the war by 
[Admiral John R�] Jellicoe and by his successor, Admiral Sir David Beatty�”69 John 
Brooks also has commented on the influence of these orders and the “limited 
scope” they provided subordinates�70
To encourage individual initiative and foster contextually driven decision-
making, the Navy deliberately refrained from publishing a fleet-wide tactical 
doctrine� Instead, specific manuals, such as the Atlantic Fleet’s “Destroyer 
Instructions,” provided detailed guidance while preserving the initiative of in-
dividual commanders� This did not mean that doctrine was unimportant� On 
the contrary, the War Instructions stressed its value, emphasizing that victory 
in battle would be aided by “[i]ndoctrination of the forces, so that there may be 
mutual understanding of the intentions and plans of the commander in chief and 
so that there may be coordination in the means and methods employed in carry-
ing out the tasks assigned and of the necessary procedure when without orders�”71
This is what Knox wanted to see� However, the War Instructions left the details 
of that doctrine unspecified� This omission allowed it to be flexible and change 
depending on circumstances� By leaving doctrinal development in the hands of 
individual commanders, the Navy could experiment more effectively (and more 
rapidly) with different techniques� The approach also ensured that those doc-
trines that were developed remained contextually sensitive�
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There were two important ramifications of the Navy’s approach� First, it 
meant that in an era of rapid technological change, the Navy avoided prematurely 
converging on any specific doctrine� It left its options open, so that as new con-
cepts and approaches emerged, doctrines could be modified rapidly to account 
for them�72 The interwar fleet problems and other tactical exercises provided a 
framework for these changes; they were part of a feedback cycle that refined the 
Navy’s doctrinal concepts in light of experience� Second, the Navy encouraged 
flexibility and individual initiative within its officer corps� Because doctrinal 
development was in their hands, lower-level commanders were encouraged to 
take responsibility and not wait for higher authorities to make the decisions� This 
fostered the commanders’ creativity and problem-solving skills, encouraging 
them to derive solutions for their own specific circumstances� It proved to be an 
extremely effective approach�
In the decade between 1913 and 1923, the Navy addressed the challenge of co-
ordinating a modern, distributed battle fleet by introducing a new, more flexible 
paradigm for commanding forces in battle� That approach combined flexible 
battle plans that framed the mission with tactical doctrines that enabled coor-
dinated action without the need for detailed instructions� In this way, the Navy 
solved the problem of ensuring alignment while also fostering creativity and 
individual initiative�
That outcome was the result of an effective process of organizational learning� 
It started with new paradigms introduced at the Naval War College: wargames, 
the conference method, and the estimate of the situation� Sims and his col-
leagues harnessed these effectively in the Atlantic Fleet� They leveraged tabletop 
wargames to explore different approaches to combat, they used the conference 
method to make sense of the results and identify lessons, and they employed the 
disciplined methodology of the estimate of the situation to understand their mis-
sion and formulate plans� Together, the officers of the Torpedo Flotilla discovered 
that repeated practice created familiarity—with their equipment, their ships, and 
each other—and that certain practices were more effective than others�
The officers developed specific routines that leveraged their strengths� These 
strengths included an emphasis on aggressive action, the use of a general plan (to 
describe desired outcomes and frame opportunities), and a reliance on individual 
initiative� These concepts appeared to be validated in World War I and therefore 
became core elements of the Navy’s doctrine, providing a foundation at the start 
of the interwar period that was refined and enhanced in the decades before World 
War II� By the time of that conflict, these core elements of the Navy’s doctrine had 
channeled and focused the Navy’s approach to combat, leading to an emphasis on 
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the use of surface gunfire and aerial attack so as to, in the words of modern naval 
tactician Wayne Hughes, “attack effectively first�”73
More important than those fundamental elements, however, was the habitual 
routine of exploring, developing, and refining tactical practices to create doc-
trine� The approach was developed initially by Sims, then expanded by Plunkett, 
Pratt, and Laning after World War I; it emphasized developing doctrine from 
the bottom up� This was a deliberate choice, and it was codified in the War 
Instructions of 1923� It allowed the Navy to explore new doctrinal approaches 
and concepts routinely� As this process was refined during the interwar period, 
lower-level commanders continued to experiment with new doctrines for their 
forces� Rapid experimentation proved critical in the early years of World War II, 
when Japanese capabilities proved to be greater than anticipated� Lessons from 
the fighting in 1942 aided victory in the battles of 1943 and 1944, when American 
officers explored new approaches in an effort to secure a potential advantage� 
That process had its roots in the work the Navy did to develop its initial doctrine 
in the decade between 1913 and 1923�74
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